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Natural resources coNflict iN the democratic  
rePuBlic of the coNgo:
a QuestioN of goverNaNce?
by Clementine Burnley*
InTroducTIon
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) is a frag-ile post-conflict state that is immensely rich in natural resources. Effective management of its mining, oil, and 
forestry resources is key to its future economic progress.1 How-
ever, the DRC is widely regarded as a textbook forum for natu-
ral resource-induced conflicts at both local and national levels.2 
If natural resources are the main cause of conflicts, then improv-
ing governance over those resources could reduce the likelihood 
of conflict. Academic studies on conflict causes could be usefully 
linked to research on governance to improve the management of 
natural resources in conflict-prone societies. For instance, studies 
have revealed that countries with high quality institutions dedicated 
to the management of valuable natural resources minimize poten-
tial problems faced by resource-rich and conflict-prone countries.3 
However, natural resource management can be complex 
and difficult due to incongruent political, social, economic, 
and environmental goals even in peaceful societies.4 Conflict-
prone societies such as the DRC present even more complex 
challenges given the underlying political and historical reasons 
for the conflicts.5 Despite these significant difficulties, best 
governance practices such as incorporating stakeholder input and 
financing strategies could both prevent and resolve conflicts. This 
article summarizes findings about a number of important external 
and internal factors fueling conflict, institutional and governance 
challenges in managing resources, and highlights a number of 
ways in which donor institutions have worked with policymakers to 
improve resource governance in the DRC. In adopting these tech-
niques for equitable and efficient natural resource management, the 
DRC could achieve long-term peace and economic stability. 
armed conFlIcT and The role  
oF naTural resources
There is a large body of quantitative research on the external 
factors relevant for understanding civil conflicts at the local, 
national, and international level.6 Examples of these external 
factors include resources type and the characteristics of the 
state.7 These studies have focused on the access to and use 
of natural resources by conflict parties, especially the role of 
conflict financing through the exploitation of natural resources.8 
Valuable natural resources like diamonds, gold, oil, timber, and 
even drug crops and medicinal plants, have been found to be 
prone to misappropriation.9 The control of these resources may 
allow rebels to generate conflict financing.10 
Along similar lines, several quantitative political science 
studies demonstrated that the abundance of natural resources 
increases the statistical risk of armed conflict at the national 
level.11 However, numerous other studies have criticized the 
robustness of such conclusions.12 This criticism reflects flaws 
such as the methodology of the quantitative studies, which fail 
to distinguish civil war onset and ongoing civil war as equal 
components of civil war prevalence.13 Despite this flaw, these 
studies can nonetheless be useful in understanding how conflict 
makes the management of natural resources more difficult and 
vice versa.14
Another set of academic studies focuses on environmental 
scarcity and competition between groups for these natural 
resources.15 Increasing demand from growing populations and 
inequalities in the distribution of natural resources can ulti-
mately lead to environmental degradation.16 These studies have 
also been criticized for methodological weaknesses, paucity of 
data, and according too much weight to environmental factors 
and too little emphasis on human factors such as technological 
innovativeness and ingenuity.17 Nevertheless, the concept of 
competition between groups over distribution of resources 
is pertinent to an understanding of the current, and sometimes 
violent, community-level conflicts over land and forest usage in 
the eastern provinces of the DRC.18 
PasT and currenT naTural resources 
conFlIcTs In The drc 
The DRC includes most of the Congo Basin region, an 
area of enormous wealth in terms of biodiversity, timber, and 
mineral resources.19 Despite this natural wealth, however, the 
DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world with signifi-
cant infrastructure deficiencies and an economy that is highly 
dependent upon agriculture and forestry.20 Violent and non-
violent conflicts linked to the use of its natural resources have 
historically prevented the DRC from fully utilizing its resources 
to generate revenue and improve quality of life for its citizens.21 
Specifically, numerous policy reports have highlighted the 
role of minerals in financing the armed groups involved in the 
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most recent DRC conflicts.22 Control over mining areas in the 
eastern provinces continues to shift between different indepen-
dent armed groups and units of the Military of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (“FARDC”).23 The struggle for control 
over these resources has exacerbated conflict and created greater 
difficulty in managing the resources to benefit the public.24 
Despite a recent transition towards peace, conflict and inse-
curity remain in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, 
Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga.25 These conflicts are par-
ticularly acute in the northeastern provinces of Ituri in Orientale, 
and North and South Kivu, where local militia and foreign rebel 
forces continue to terrorize the regions.26 A prime example of 
conflict is the Virunga National Park (“Park”) located in north-
eastern DRC, on the border with Uganda and Rwanda.27 The 
Park was the site of some of the large-scale armed conflicts that 
occurred in the Kivu Provinces.28 The 1994 Rwandan genocide 
and resulting refugee crisis led to the presence of about 700,000 
refugees on the edges of the Park.29 These displaced groups 
increased the consumption of resources both inside and outside 
the Park, furthering the impact on the environment and leading 
to mass deforestation.30
Identity and nationality, which are linked to land and politi-
cal power, have also played an important part in the different 
conflicts of the DRC. In the absence of alternative income-
earning opportunities in the formal economy or in commerce, 
access to land is essential to livelihoods in DRC.31 There have 
been several historic conflicts over grazing land and land 
ownership between Hema and Lendu peoples in Ituri.32 These 
conflicts have killed 10,000 and displaced 50,000.33 Moreover, 
these types of conflicts are likely to continue until those natural 
resources with income-generating potential, such as timber, are 
better managed.34
naTural resource managemenT and 
governance challenges 
The twin challenges of governance for the DRC are to 
provide security for all of its citizens and to build democratic, 
transparent, and accountable institutions capable of manag-
ing its enormous resource wealth for the benefit of its entire 
population.35 Although the existing legal framework recognizes 
the right to use land via customary law, it also allows for land 
grabbing, the purchase of occupied land, and the eviction of 
tenants.36 And since the government retains the right to define 
“Congolese people,” the issue of who is entitled to land rights is 
highly politicized.37 Further tensions stem from the unclear role 
of formal and customary authorities.38 Thus legal reform is nec-
essary to prevent future land-grabbing opportunities that could 
cause armed conflict.39 Legitimizing certain existing formal 
and customary systems of land administration, and providing a 
forum for land use disputes, could help diffuse both future con-
flicts and lay a framework for sustainable land management.48
The demarcation of conservation areas in the DRC is also a 
contentious political issue. The existence of conservation areas 
has been linked to colonial land demarcations, which are not 
always understood or accepted by the communities affected.40 
In response, managers of these protected areas have engaged 
in participatory management methods involving local communi-
ties, such as consultations, participatory demarcation, and the 
creation of alternative livelihood activities.41 
However, conflict exists not only over the natural resources 
but also over collaboration: site-specific, cross-border collabo-
ration efforts between conservation organizations in Rwanda, 
DRC, and Uganda have continued during various wars at the 
regional level.42 Furthermore, the DRC continues to face signifi-
cant challenges in its reform processes in all natural resources 
sectors.43 The widespread disintegration of government func-
tionality during the prolonged conflicts has left a legacy of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies in knowledge, expertise, capacity, 
and resourcing across all sectors.44 These shortcomings mean 
that institutions often are unable to respond to the serious prob-
lems they face.45 For instance, in the area of education, only 
thirty-two percent of teachers in secondary school and twenty 
percent of those in higher education are qualified at the level 
mandated by their posts.46 Congo’s National Statistical Institute 
(“INS”) lacks resources to collect the necessary information by 
which ministries’ performance can be verified.47 Even in areas 
where periodic reporting is mandatory, such as the mining indus-
try, it is still difficult to find reliable data on mining operators, 
production, or exported commodities.48
Transparency in governance remains another main chal-
lenge to effective natural resources in the DRC. The country now 
ranks 164th out of 178 in the 2011 Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index, while the World Bank/IFC Doing 
Business 2011 survey ranks DRC 175th out of 183 countries.49 
A number of authors have highlighted the negative effects of 
corruption on the management of natural resources in DRC.50 
For instance, policy processes are prone to disruption by politi-
cians acting in their own, rent-seeking interests.51 Furthermore, 
government agents at mine sites illegally tax the operations in 
eastern DRC, justifying their practice by blaming the lack of 
monetary support from the central government.52
The need For caPacITy BuIldIng In The drc 
The concept of “capacity” refers to the ability of individuals 
and institutions to conceive and carry out decisions effectively 
and efficiently.53 There is a clear need for institutional capacity 
building in the DRC to ensure compliance with the international 
norms and agreements relevant to environmental management.54 
At the individual level, capacity building refers to the 
processes of teaching and skills training.55 At the local and 
national institutional level, improvements to the functioning 
of institutions and capacity of administrators could help civil 
services better use revenue and natural resources to reduce 
poverty.56 Increasingly, administrators are using capacity build-
ing to encourage ownership through participation and mutual 
exchange of knowledge.57 Building individual capacity in terms 
of natural resource management would involve increasing the 
level of expertise in its legal, scientific, or technical aspects.58 
For example, increasing expertise in the implementation and 
monitoring of regulatory compliance or increasing awareness of 
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the conflict risk in managing natural resources would increase 
the government and different communities’ ability to address 
these conflicts.59 Moreover, increasing scientific expertise in 
the geological field would allow DRC’s institutions to improve 
their negotiating power with extractive industry counterparts.60 
Similarly, capacity building for local businesses could help 
to promote the development of homegrown industries in the 
minerals sector.61 
On the international level, governance initiatives relevant 
to the environment in the DRC are conditioned by the various 
international treaties and environmental agreements to which 
the country is a signatory.62 These initiatives and treaties specify 
actions to protect the DRC’s biodiversity, endangered species, 
timber, and wetlands as well as to mitigate climate change.63 
USAID and the European Development Fund both have agree-
ments with the DRC to fund such programs, which encompass 
regional conservation and production areas.64 Given this outside 
support for local and national institutions, it is vital to create 
an implementation framework that creates coherent sector-wide 
programs.65 
Specifically, the DRC is currently developing a governance 
framework for the forestry sector.66 The population is highly 
dependent on the forestry sector and, although precise data is 
uncertain, the expansive forests of the DRC provide a wide array 
of benefits, including timber for domestic use and export, fuel 
wood, a variety of forest foods and medicines, and a carbon 
sink for sequestration programs.67 It is estimated that the DRC’s 
timber resources are equal to that of all other African countries 
combined and the timber industry is expected to benefit from 
increasing demand in China and India.68 Therefore, this sector 
is a high priority for reform.69 The ongoing forestry reforms 
are part of the preparation of a national strategy for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(“REDD”), by the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conserva-
tion and Tourism (known by the French acronym “MECNT”).70 
The DRC’s 2002 Forest Code is an important first step in both 
regulating an important resource and creating an implementation 
framework for fund programs such as REDD. 71
BesT PracTIces oF PosT-conFlIcT naTural 
resources managemenT 
Land use conflicts between different resource users and 
managers have often arisen in eastern DRC. And although 
individual organizations managing land within or adjacent to 
protected areas have each addressed the conflicts differently, 
a number of good practices have been proven to reduce usage 
conflicts.72 Such practices include devolving rights to local 
communities, diversifying economic activities around protected 
areas, improving land use planning and zoning, securing tenure 
to land and resources, ensuring stakeholder participation in 
resource management, integrating policies relating to natural 
resources, and legitimizing community-based management 
initiatives.73 Given the success of these tactics, many national 
programs in the DRC are beginning to embrace these concepts.
Accordingly, donors and the government of the DRC are 
working together to build institutional and individual capacities 
for participatory management of natural resources in various 
sectors.74 
forestry 
In the forestry sector, the International Development 
Association and the Global Environment Facility are support-
ing the Forest and Nature Conservation Project to provide 
infrastructure, equipment, training, and project coordination 
at the national level for the MECNT, regional, and provin-
cial management bodies.75 Implementing best practices will 
strengthen MECNT’s institutional capacity to as well as commu-
nity participation in sustainable forest management.76 Striving 
for similar goals, WWF and United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (“UN-HABITAT”) are collaborating to manage 
conflicts linked to land tenure bordering protected areas in east-
ern DRC, combining participatory demarcation with conflict 
mediation and land administration.77
To facilitate best practices, it is important to recognize that 
the external economic environment, such as levels of direct 
foreign investment and variability in price of commodities, 
is largely outside the control of the Congolese.78 However, Con-
golese policymakers and administrators can nonetheless control 
how revenues and investments are managed.79 Improvements to 
the institutional governance systems for resource revenues have 
focused on increasing efficiency in three dimensions: manage-
ment, allocation of revenue, and distribution of benefits.80 
International efforts have focused on supporting transpar-
ency in revenue management and restricting the financing 
of armed groups.81 The Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (“EITI”) tries to increase transparency surrounding 
resources exploitation, revenue generation, and budget alloca-
tions.82 The DRC has been classified by the EITI as “close to 
compliant.”83 Transparency initiative objectives support the 
disclosure of information for the extractive industry and civil 
stakeholders’ demands for accountability from policymakers 
and institutions.84 However, it will take time for capacity build-
ing to redress the current imbalance between levels of influence 
by state and civil society actors.85 At the moment, capacity and 
knowledge gaps on the part of civil society mean that it is diffi-
cult for civil stakeholders to hold institutions and political actors 
accountable for their actions.86 
miNiNg
Trade restrictions have also been introduced to reduce 
availability of resource-based financing to conflict actors.87 For 
example, the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds is an 
intergovernmental process established to regulate and reduce 
trading in diamonds from rebel-controlled areas.88 This and 
other similar initiatives require companies to report whether 
their supply chain contains minerals sourced from conflict zones 
that may have contributed to the financing of armed groups.89 
This, in turn, requires due diligence and traceability mechanisms 
to distinguish between “clean” and “dirty” minerals.90 
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In the DRC, a number of traceability initiatives already exist 
at the national, regional, and international levels. At the national 
level, the DRC’s Mining Law of 2002 requires community 
consultations, disclosure of contract terms by both companies 
and the government, and revenue transparency through adher-
ence to EITI guidelines.91 The publication of the 2010 Mining 
Contracts Review, carried out to determine benefits of these 
contracts to the DRC, is still in progress.92
At the regional level, several regional groups have adopted 
traceability and accountability mechanisms. The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), 
for example, has drawn up auditing guidelines for mineral 
processors.93 The International Conference of the Great Lakes 
has also committed to a regional certification mechanism, which 
provides a clear procedure and adequate records of mineral 
origins.94 The International Tin Research Initiative has also 
improved due diligence, traceability, and certification processes 
for tin through the Tin Supply Chain Initiative.95 However, 
these traceability initiatives in DRC ultimately face difficulties 
linked to cost, implementation, monitoring, human capacity, and 
resource gaps.96
National initiatives supplement industry-led and regional 
traceability schemes. In the United States, the recent 2010 
Conflict Minerals Provision of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires companies to 
represent accurate information regarding the source and supply 
chain of certain minerals.97 The German Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Natural Resources has supported the estab-
lishment of Certified Trading Chains.98 These initiatives would 
assist in reducing resource-based financing to conflict actors 
through international trade channels.99
There are some examples of good non-renewable resource 
management in from countries of the global north. Norway, for 
example, has successfully used macroeconomic tools to guide 
oil revenues, domestic oil retention, and revenue utilization, 
avoiding the potentially harmful effects of equitable redistribu-
tion.100 In this way, Norway has managed to avoid the typical 
problems of an oil economy, such as the boom-bust cycle and 
wealth concentration.101 Despite the fact that the two countries 
differ in their government accountability systems and transpar-
ency, Norway’s solutions may provide guidance to the DRC.102 
Combining Norway’s approach with transparency and account-
ability initiatives could provide a better system for managing 
non-renewable resources.103
The challenge for the DRC is to improve the workings of 
institutional and political processes at both the national and 
the local level to ensure that natural resources are used in a 
sustainable manner to improve the lives of communities. 
International examples of successful resource management 
are often supported by international organizations and private 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”). The World Heritage 
Institute (UNESCO), Congolese Institute for the Conservation 
of Nature (“ICCN”), and local NGOs are currently collaborating 
on “Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict: 
Protecting World Heritage in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.”104 That project, which has been running since 2000 
with multi-donor funding, supports not only the key financial, 
logistical, and technical sectors, but also provides access to the 
higher political decision-makers at the national regional and 
international levels.105
 Another example, the World Wildlife Fund’s (“WWF”) 
Eco-Makala Project, has responded to the deforestation by refu-
gees in the southern part of the Virunga National Park in North 
Kivu Province by introducing legal fuel wood plantations.106 The 
WWF project increases the availability of sustainable energy 
for the area around Goma and to reduce rural poverty in Masisi 
and Rutshuru.107 The United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”) Central Africa Regional Program on 
the Environment is helping to support the WWF, demarking 
protected areas using a combination of participatory methods, 
mapping, and GIS tools.108 The project works with local com-
munities and chiefs, restricting access to certain areas in order to 
sensitize communities to the benefits of maintaining biodiversity 
in their surrounding areas.109 Conservation International is sup-
porting the ICCN to jointly manage resource reserves with local 
communities in the Equateur Province to provide livelihood 
alternatives and also to track deforestation.110
With normalization of relations between the DRC and 
Rwanda, and integration of some armed groups into the state 
army and police forces, the most important conflict management 
processes affecting the Kivu Provinces have taken place at the 
national and international level.111 Security sector reform is 
also ongoing, but still leaves much to be desired.112 The most 
immediate challenge for policymakers is to end illegal control 
over, and taxation of, mining, both by the Congolese army and 
by armed groups.113 This would require bringing areas currently 
under the control of armed groups under state control through 
military action or negotiation.114 
Additionally, the government needs to stop those at the 
highest military and political levels from seizing the profits from 
minerals. A number of specific recommendations have been 
made by expert organizations working in the field of safeguards, 
advocating the monitoring and inspection systems for mining 
areas where the Congolese military are deployed and reinforce-
ment of military sanctions to end impunity and increase account-
ability in army units.115
conclusIon
The theories of environmental scarcity and of natural 
resources wealth as conflict causes in the DRC are well docu-
mented. What remains unclear, however, is why large-scale 
armed violence persists in some eastern provinces of the 
country, while other, equally resource rich provinces, such as 
Katanga and the hinterlands of the Kivu Provinces, escape such 
violence.116 This suggests that additional tensions, such as those 
between industrial and artisanal miners and those linked to local 
socioeconomic factors are of the upmost relevance.117
This article has described the consequences of prolonged 
instability for natural resource management in the DRC. Fur-
ther, natural resources management remains a low priority for 
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political actors, many of whom favor the consolidation of power 
and wealth.118 The presence of those stakeholders who instigate 
and profit from instability constitutes the major obstacle to 
effective natural resources management and to improvements in 
overall governance in the DRC.119
The political, economic, and social contexts in which natural 
resources are used and the manner in which resources are man-
aged is paramount to prevent and manage conflicts at all levels. 
The nature and scale of the conflicts described in this paper are 
each different and, therefore, the management approaches cor-
respondingly different. 
This article has also outlined a number of ways in which 
donor institutions have worked with policymakers to improve 
resource governance in the DRC. The initiatives described sup-
port alternative income opportunities for local communities, 
redistribution of revenues from some extractive industries, and 
prevention of local resources usage conflicts. Many of the natu-
ral resources management activities have had active participa-
tion of communities as a key component.
Governance objectives are often broadly formulated to 
strengthen institutions, build institutional and human capacity, 
and improve rule of law. These broad aims, while useful as guid-
ing principles, remain extremely abstract. Successful governance, 
however, requires specific measures and binding timeframes for 
implementation in order to reform key areas such as the accurate 
monitoring and legal enforcement of natural resources manage-
ment strategies. While the institutional structures and processes 
may already be in place, it will still take a long planning process, 
significant additional resources, and political will to achieve the 
needed transparency and accountability for the management of 
all natural resources sectors in the DRC. 
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